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I.
DID THE COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY OF CONDUCT
THE PARTIES PRIOR TO THE DIVORCE AND WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR TO INCLUDE SUCH EVIDENCE
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS.

IN
OF
IT
IN

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
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$1,350.00 PER MONTH.
III. WERE THE TRIAL COURT'S AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
TRIAL.
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF AN INCREASE OF $1,547.00
PER MONTH CHILD SUPPORT.
V.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR J.N.O.V.
VI.
DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES.
VII. DID THE COURT ERR
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.

IN

NOT

GRANTING

VIII. SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE HAVE BEEN
DISQUALIFIED TO HEAR THIS MATTER.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEANNA FOXLEY

:
A P P E A L

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY

:
:

Case No. 890493-CA

:

Appeal from the Third
Judicial District Court

Defendant/Appellant
Hon. Richard H. Moffat

STATEMENT OF COURT OF APPEAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

is conferred

on

this Court

pursuant

to

Article VIII, Section 5, Utah State Constitution, Section 78-2a3(2h) Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This

is

an

appeal

by

defendant

(husband)

from

a

modification of decree of divorce which awarded plaintiff (wife)
an increase in child support, an increase in alimony and attorneys
fees.
The action was brought pursuant to Section 30-3-5 UCA
(1953) .
The matter was heard before Honorable Richard Moffat,
Judge of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
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Trial of the matter came on for hearing on September 22,
1988, Trial Transcript #1 (TRl) and was continued to March 7, 1989,
Trial Transcript #2 (TR2).

Thereafter defendant filed an objection

to findings and several motions which were heard on June 1, 1989,
Trial

Transcript

#3

(TR3);

defendant

filed

a

motion

to

stay

execution of judgment which was heard on October 27, 1989, Trial
Transcript #4 (TR4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.
DID THE COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY OF CONDUCT
THE PARTIES PRIOR TO THE DIVORCE AND WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR TO INCLUDE SUCH EVIDENCE
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS.

IN
OF
IT
IN

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY ORDERING ALIMONY INCREASED FROM $10.00 TO
$1,350.00 PER MONTH.
III. WERE THE TRIAL COURT'S AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
TRIAL.
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF AN INCREASE OF $1,547.00
PER MONTH CHILD SUPPORT.
V.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR J.N.O.V.
VI.
DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES.
VII. DID THE COURT ERR
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.

IN

NOT

GRANTING

VIII. SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE HAVE BEEN
DISQUALIFIED TO HEAR THIS MATTER.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by defendant (husband) from an order
of modification awarding plaintiff

(wife) an increase of child

support from $150.00 per month per child to $546.00 per month per
child; an increase in alimony from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per month;
ordering defendant to provide health and dental insurance; and,
awarding plaintiff the sum of $4,394.00 in attorneys fees.
Defendant is asking the Court to reverse the court's
order in its entirety and to award him attorneys fees and costs of
his appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 8, 1976, the parties above-named were married
(TR2 16).

During the course of the marriage three (3) children

were born to the parties
daughter

(TRl 25:14) and defendant

from Plaintiff's prior marriage

adopted a

(TRl 28:13-17).

The

parties separated in April, 1982, after five and one-half (5 1/2)
years of marriage (TRl 44:1) and were divorced on June 30, 1983
(TRl 44:1).

The defendant graduated from medical school in June,

1983, (TR2 49:16).

The terms of the divorce decree were stipulated

to by counsel and the decree itself was drafted by plaintiff's
attorney

(See Exhibit

"A").

The decree of divorce originally

contained the following paragraph pertaining to alimony:
"4. That the plaintiff is awarded an interest
in the defendant's medical degree, and is
awarded the sum of $10.00 per month as alimony,
and that at such time as the defendant's income
will support paying a greater amount of
alimony, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
seek a greater amount of alimony from the
court." (See attached Exhibit "A".)
3

The decree of divorce

was amended to read as follows;

"4. That the plaintiff has an interest in the
defendant's medical degree, and is awarded the
sum of $10.00 per month alimony, and that at
such time as there has been a material change
in circumstances of the parties the issues of
child support and/or alimony may be reviewed."
(Changes have been emphasized.)
Plaintiff has been a student from 1983 until the time of
trial (TR2 57:16-17).
In June, 1984 plaintiff earned her Bachelors degree in
sociology (TR2 56:23-25) and anticipates earning her Masters degree
in June, 1989 (TR2 57:3).
She intends on earning her Doctorate degree which she
estimates will take five to ten more years (TR1 31:6-8).
During 1986 and 1987, plaintiff earned $12,000.00 per
year from two part-time jobs.

(TR1 63:8-12)

In 1988 one of plaintiff's part-time jobs ended and she
voluntarily did not increase her hours at her other part-time job.
(TR1 64)
Plaintiff estimated her income with child support at
$2,200.00 per month at the time of trial.

(TR2 70:7-9)

Plaintiff testified that her monthly expenses ranged
from

$1,350.00

(copy of

(estimates) per month.

checks

from discovery)

to $1,800.00

(TR1 53:9-10 and 16-18; TR1 58:19-22; and

TR1 60:4-10)
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Plaintiff itemized her expenses as follows:
TRl 37::l-2

Food

$

225.,00 per month

TRl 37;: 14

Utilities

170,.00 per month

TRl 37::17

Telephone

40..00 per month

TRl 37::19

Clothing

50,.00 per month

TRl 38::17

Car expenses

150..00 per month

TRl 38::20

Car payment

165,.00 per month

TRl 39::5

Dr.

TRl 39::9

Dental

30,.00 per month

TRl 39::14-15

Insurance

90,.00 per month

TRl 40::3

House payment

TRl 40::19

Tutor

TRl 40 :19

Miscellaneous

50..00 per month

bills

467 .00 per month
25,.00 per month
400 .00 per month

$1,862.00

Plaintiff testified that her lifestyle had not changed
during the interim period between the divorce and this hearing.
(TRl 67:15-17)
The plaintiff testified at a deposition that she did not
want alimony as such (TRl 67:18-20) and she testified that she
wanted

restitution

marriage.

because

she

had

earned

alimony

during

the

(TR2 55:13-25 and 56:1-2)
Plaintiff testified that she would use alimony to buy a

new home (TRl 68:8-10), clothes (TRl 68:13), and furniture and for
retirement (TRl 68,69).
5

She

testified

the current

home

that she had was in

substantial disrepair (TRl 32), but that she had never tried to
sell the home (TRl 52, 53).
Defendant testified that his income in 1982 was $50.00
per month.

(TR2 34:1)
Defendant received his medical degree in June 1983 . At

the time of graduation he had been separated from the plaintiff for
fifteen (15) months (TR2 90:16-18).
After

his

internship,

defendant

moved

to

Winslow,

Arizona, where he had practiced his specialty of obstetrics and
gynecology for the last twenty (20) months

(TR2 14:9-13).

In 1987 defendant had a gross income of $112,358.00.
(TR2 38:1-3) without deductions for business expenses.
Since 1987 liability insurance has gone up 50 percent
for gynecologists and obstetricians (TR2 96:7-11).
first opened

When defendant

his practice, insurance was $12,000.00 per year.

Current estimates are that insurance will be $75,000.00 per year
(TR2 96:12-17).
Defendant testified that his current gross income was
between $5,000.00 and $5,500.00 per month (TR2 97:11-14).
Defendant testified that he carried health insurance on
his children at a cost of $335.00 per month (TR2 101:20-22).
Defendant introduced a child support worksheet with the
following foundation (TR2 102):
Gross income was $5,208.33, calculated on
gross business income of $340,000 minus
business expenses of approximately $277,500.00.
(TR2 98:11-13, 102:11-14)

Based on the foregoing foundation, child support should
be

set

at

$1,044.00

per

month

assuming

the

court

granted

plaintiff's petition for modification (TR2 1-3).
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF'S
TESTIMONY OF CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES PRIOR TO
THE DIVORCE.
Two diverse positions were argued by the parties during
the trial.
Plaintiff took the position that because she was awarded
an interest in defendant's medical degree that she was entitled to
some award based on the recent case of Martinez v. Martinez, 80
Utah Adv. Rep. 35

(Utah App.

1988), in the form of

equitable

restitution or some other novel remedy.
Defendant argued that the initial decree of divorce did
not award plaintiff

equitable

restitution, therefore

plaintiff

could not modify the decree on that basis by rearguing facts that
occurred prior to the divorce.

The relief in the decree was Res

Judicata.
Defendant further asserted that because the Utah Court
of Appeals had held that a medical degree is not marital property
[Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P2d 237, 239-42 (Utah App. 1987) and
Rayburn v. Rayburn,

738

P2d

238, 240

(Utah App.

1987)] that

plaintiff's remedy was to show substantial change of circumstances

7

justifying a modification as contemplated by the decree of divorce
as amended by interlineation.
The trial court judge ruled that the decree of divorce,
as

amended

in

1983

awarding

plaintiff

an

interest

in

the

defendant's medical degree, would be held void pursuant to Martinez
(Supra).
The court said the case would be reviewed on traditional
grounds
increase

of substantial
of alimony

charges

and

of

circumstances

child support, and

declaration in its minute entry and decision.

warranting

included

the

an

same

(See Exhibit "B".)

"The Court does not find it necessary to invoke
the
recently
declared
novel
theory
of
"equitable restitution" as enunciated by the
Utah Court of Appeals nor is it necessary to
invoke the provisions of the divorce decree
wherein Judge Condor awarded an interest in
the
defendant's
medical
degree
to
the
plaintiff. The Court finds that the change of
circumstances above set forth are sufficient
to justify the award herein without further
findings regarding the questions relating to
the defendant's medical degree." (Our court's
minute entry.)
Defendant would argue that because the court had so ruled
that

it

was

error

to

allow

testimony

by

the

plaintiff

over

objection of defendant (TR1 20:1-10) of events that occurred prior
to the divorce and for the court to include such evidence in its
factual findings, specifically paragraph 7, which states:
"7. During the marriage, the plaintiff could
not pursue her formal education due to frequent
relocations of the defendant in pursuing his
medical career, because plaintiff was employed
at various times during the marriage to assist
in the support of the family, and due to the
8

fact that plaintiff was pregnant for a major
portion of the time."
The trial court judge denied defendant's motion to strike
findings

#7

(TR3-18:6-8).

Defendant's argument is that the trial court abused its
discretion by in reality awarding plaintiff a form of equitable
restitution without supporting evidence and while calling it a
change of circumstances.
It was prejudicial error to let pre-divorce testimony in
and to include it in the court's findings of fact #7 (TR3 18:6-8).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
ORDERING ALIMONY INCREASED FROM $10.00
$1,350.00 PER MONTH.
A,

BY
TO

The evidence did not support the findings of an increase

in alimony to $1,350.00 per month.
1.

The findings of fact were not adequate to support

the alimony awarded by the court.
To avoid a challenge in awarding alimony a court must
consider three factors.
—

The financial condition and needs of the
spouse claiming support

—

Ability of that spouse to provide a
sufficient income for herself

—

Ability of the responding spouse to pay
Jones v. Jones, 700 P2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

9

In Jones

(Supra) the court held that the trial court

"...must exercise its discretion in accordance with the standards
that have been set by the court."
If the court does not analyze the circumstances in light
of the three factors listed above, then under Jones (Supra) the
court has "...abused its discretion in fixing the alimony award."
The findings in the case at bar do not contain anything
that would allow the court to reasonably determine an amount to
award

plaintiff

an

increase

in alimony

nor

was

any

evidence

offered.
Further,

there

was

no

evidence

of

what

would

be

a

sufficient income for plaintiff and her ability to provide the
same.
The defendant brought the same objection numerous times
in post judgment motions, indicating to the court that findings
should reflect

the standard enumerated

in Jones

(Supra)

(TR3

34:16-19)
Defendant argued that there was no evidence, findings or
basis as to how the court came up with the amount of alimony (TR3
41:1-23).

Defendant

requested

the

court

numerous

times

to

enumerate the basis.
Counsel for plaintiff responded by suggesting that it
was sufficient to request that amount in plaintiff's petition for
modification (TR3 42:1-22) and indicated it was impossible to come
up with an amount.

10

"...you know, that was simply impossible for
us to do. If they wanted that, they could have
done it, but it was impossible for us to do.
If they wanted that, they could have done it,
but it was impossible for us to do. We were
extremely limited on the basis and comes into
this Court and asks for certain things. And
then to have to pay for them, just in the hope
that we get in when that money can be much
better used in the support of the children and
for the necessities of the children and my
client—for my client, the plaintiff."
The trial court's position was that it was the duty of
the prevailing party to draft adequate findings because that party
was ultimately the one that would have to sustain it on appeal so
he would let the findings stand.

(TR3 20:5-6)

"Failure of the trial court to make findings
on all material issues is reversible error
unless the facts in the record are clear,
uncontroversial and capable of supporting only
awarding in favor of the Judgment."
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P2d 996 (Utah 1987)
Kinnella v. Baugh, 660 P2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)
Because even the plaintiff admits it was impossible to
establish a value for alimony and because the record reflects no
evidence that would supply an amount, the award of alimony should
be reversed.
2.

There was no evidence nor finding as to what was a

sufficient income for plaintiff.
Neither

the

court's

findings

nor

did

the

evidence

presented, contain anything that would enable the court to

11

establish an income amount that would provide plaintiff sufficient
income for her needs.
When asked

the direct question as to why she wanted

alimony, plaintiff responded she did not want alimony:
"Q. Do you recall being asked the question why
you want alimony, and you responded that you
don f t want alimony?
A.

Yes.

I remember that.11
(TR1 67:18-20)

Plaintiff felt that the relief she was requesting was a
financial award based on pre-divorce testimony.
The trial court was also perplexed over the amount the
plaintiff needed.
"THE COURT:
Yeah, I agree. I haven't heard
from anybody, a dollar figure that she thinks
she ought to get per month on either alimony
or child support.
We've heard testimony of
need and testimony of the fact that the doctor
has [sic] now voluntarily paying a thousand
dollars per month.
But I haven't heard, I
admit, any figure on what she really thinks she
ought to have in either figure...But what I
think we have to look at, is what his current
need is, what is his current ability to pay and
giving some effect to the decree as interpreted
by Martinez to come up with some kind of a
monthly figure and how I am going to do that
I am not sure. But I think that's where we're
headed.
(TR1 48:9-15 and 49:6-11)
When asked what she needed alimony for, the plaintiff
made the following response:

12

,f

MR , ERICKSEN: What wou.d you use alimony
f i»i" , J f you got it?
A.
A I would invent pa-* :r *^e money
into a new home; I been wanting to do that for
a long time. Certainly, probably some personal
needs that I have,
Q

Like wl lat .?

A.
Oh, I am in need of some personal
things, like a new winter coat and clothes and
I would like to have some of my furniture
redone.
And the furniture that 1 had when I
moved and married Bill was all brand new. He
ruined two of my wooden tables completely. He
proceeded to sleep on my couch almost every
day; that it's totally ruined and the wear and
tear of years and years of using, I think I
deserve a little better standard of living,
I really do
Q.

. :•(..! " w »."!rl f..

* . l,t- rost y o u 9

— v. p e :'i b- - v •:

priced \ t
run $!**:-"

.id.: :

i ' "I m c w the ccucr.es I looked at
" ' - • *-% a
he nejv

thes t:*c

want

question t: ;r x i:
March 7 4 , , 9-o"'

... 'aat I asked the same
tr.e deposition taken on

* remember that
1
Q.
Ma /;.•
*. .„ - Will
r e i r H s 11
r e c o l l e c t JO:;
'):, line 17 p a g e 8 5 .

A,
;.
A

y o u.!"

n.
">'iu w e r e a s k e d w h a t y o u w o u l d
* w ^our alimony would be spent.

•!•

Ul i huh.

Q
::fou recal 1 that your answer w a s , that
you wou Id put: it into a retirement fund?
13

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recall, that you indicated

you would buy a new car?
A.

I probably said that."
(TR1 68:6-25 through 69:1-15)

In no instance in this case was a value placed on the
needs of the plaintiff to enable the trial judge to come up with
an amount.
Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P2d 123 (Utah App. 1987) indicates
that there must be some clear rational for the level of alimony
consistent with stated criteria (at 126).
In this case there was no evidence of a dollar amount or
range as to what was a sufficient income for plaintiff so that the
court could evaluate her present income, plus prospective income,
plus child support, plus alimony.

Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 29;

196 P2d 977 (1956).
There is nothing in the court's findings nor was any
evidence given as to whether plaintiff was short in meeting her
monthly obligations and whether those monthly obligations reflected
a standard of living that was equitable for the plaintiff six (6)
years after the decree of divorce was entered.
Defendant acknowledges that plaintiff testified that she
was behind on her mortgage and property taxes on her home.

But,

nowhere is that delinquency attributed to a shortfall in income.
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Defendant

wc - ; 1

J

p l a i n t :-rf

needs

f .;;-'-

ufJ

arc-e
*

r

tv^*

^ - . .*r,,M 1 .-^
"i '

" rv : ; ,4

•:

i^dndarri

. vr. i T 1 ::.

* w ~*

JS" urec^ca'e

award r 1 a \ i:non*:

Alimony snouia nci
reward for fhp wifp
I

-

-:-

English v. English, * - ^"

rlf-c 1

^.-- >

r

t.nat

what

p sir.r *, M

-ko 4^ .< • >;tan 1 ^
w--

^*«-o r

alimony in

v.v-.

r, .

future physician.
pi r-ii n* ix t ' s d e p o s i t i o n
1 Qo -

-

*

+

**a* w ^

fak"e:

' - •

"Q .
alimony?

•

Maron

r .. ;•. ; ; ^ *.. . n •

A1 1.d 11 1 a t: " s

t: 1 1 e basis

for

wanting

Ai-. i
f you could go back I think
one quest a o.*: or tw-.-., what you asked me I
understood i 1 t. n*- in the context of, you
know, am I after alimony strictly because I
want a better livelihood. And that is no, the
answer to that is no
I feel that I
contributed, and as such it's like getting a
return on my investment essentially."
(Deanna Foxiey deposition, page 58, lines 18"Q.
...The question is, why do you want
alimony and so f a r —
A.
I think I explained that to you as
to sacrifices and other things that ~ upn : •-.-.to help him get through.
Q.
A
r

five

- 1 )ast?
. r ; rig

»
/-ring
y e a r s a.- • ~

'
your

marriage
marriage,
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JLII

tne

ia:-r

A.

Isn't that what this is relevant to?

Q.
Well, I'm asking you, is that what
you are claiming alimony, based on what you
did five years ago?
A.
I believe it's based on the fact that
I earned alimony or, as I said earlier, some
sort of restitution."
(TR2 55:13-25 through 56:1-2)
The award

of

$1,350.00

per month

alimony

should

be

reversed.
3.
did

not

have

There was no finding nor evidence that the plaintiff
the

ability

to provide

a sufficient

income

for

herself.
Without a finding and evidence as to what was sufficient
income to support a standard of living, it would be impossible to
determine if plaintiff had the ability to provide the necessary
income to meet the standard.
The evidence at trial was that plaintiff was voluntarily
keeping her

income

low when she had both the opportunity

and

ability to earn more.
Plaintiff testified that she had received her Bachelors
degree

in sociology

in

1984

(TR1

29:1-10), would

receive

her

Masters degree in sociology in May 1989 (TR1 30:17-18).
The plaintiff testified that she had two part-time jobs
and that in 1986 and 1987 she earned approximately $12,000.00 per
year (TR1 63:8-12).
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Just prior to trial she testified that she was laid off
from _ "le of tne p^r'-t . n- -.-..>-

"""' : f 4

j , and voluntarily refused

to 1.
"Q.
Isn't it true
m a t you could just
by
merely
applying
to
the
Veteran's
Administration, get more hoi: :-s?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you haver

A.

I have not,"

- ;i.ec :de. to do that?

"Q.
Do you rememher testifying you could
have gone to the V.A. and got a better job?
A.
All I said was tha; ±i I applied for
a full-time clerk/typist job, I could probably
get 40-hour-a-week clerk/typist lor
Ru
I
v
don't
want
that
kind
of
:.
Ericksen."
l.:u
-:.-.,:..
a minimum

$ . •• ,'0: K '• < an i $

<*T between

o5*18-23)

»-;< .-lt . -* +-o p?,rn

00 CM

nei

^a

*.. a

^r s p^r^rr^

•---*-^ -*

Masters degree (TR2 64 2 0-23).
Defendan 1 "s ex peri. • • ' .mare-;: income
Bachelors

aegree

$19, Of. .-.00 per- vp^r
a Mas •

^aiar;
7* •

p

range

.oerwee*

$

GCK

*

. 4 ; and $iy,uui

to
i

. :-^
D e s p i t e tfiis •. r e f - r e ^ testim-.ny

as

f

perpetual without a

•

t;=e --lur* c-(-'* ^".iinony
.;
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abilities which was a clear abuse of the court's discretion and
reversible error.
B.

The

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

by

awarding

plaintiff equitable restitution.
What the trial court in reality did when it modified
alimony from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per month without a termination
date was to award plaintiff a form of equitable restitution but
couch it in substantial change of circumstances language.
Such an approach was an absolute abuse of discretion for
the following reasons:
1.

The marriage was of short duration
approximately 5 1/2 years.

2.

The divorce was a stipulated default
hearing. There was no indication in
the record as to whether the court
considered reasons why plaintiff was
entitled
to
an
interest
in
defendant's medical degree.

3.

The language awarding alimony and an
interest
in defendant's
medical
degree was vague and ambiguous at
best.
Language was interlined and
replaced with language that required
a
substantial
change
of
circumstances.
(See Exhibit "A"
attached.)

6.

The
trial
court
was
without
discretion to retry the divorce on
the alimony issue and should have
reviewed
the
alimony
award
on
traditional substantial change of
circumstances grounds. Instead, it
is clear that the court felt that
value should be placed on the
defendant's degree and fashioned an
amount
without
any
supporting
evidence or findings.
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The d e f e n d a n t
June
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7r- • * "
usee
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to this approach
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::ess that

Rasband,
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coi irt
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' n;. ; • r.<- amended

fi'::^h "TK
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w a s i lot the same as the court w r o t e in its m e m o r a n d u m d e c i s i o n
included
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A;s

amended

on

nor

findin :;•--. ,

M

.Seems to me, what we have to look at w h e n
you come to the standard we have a l w a y s had of
c h a n g e of c i r c u m s t a n c e s , w i t h a b i l i t y to pay
and need, and then the concept of she h e l p e d
p r o v i d e the d e g r e e , she ought to get s o m e t h i n g
out if d u r i n g a time of need.
And you s e e , 1
am q u a l i f y i n g that d u r i n g the time of need
think that what w e ' v e got to look: at:
here ;s m o r e and I am a w a r e t h a t — w e l l a w a r e
of the fact the d e f e n d a n t ' s [sic] v i e w of this
is d i f f e r e n t than m i n e .
But what I think w e
have to look at, is what his current need is,
what is his current a b i l i t y to pay and g i v i n g
some effect to the d e c r e e as i n t e r p r e t e d by
M a r t i n e z to come up w i t h some kind of a m o n t h l y
figure and how I am g o i n g to do that, I am not
si ire. But 1 think that's w h e r e w e ' r e h e a d e d . "
(TR1 48 : 2 3-2 S and

"THE COURT • We * . • •. s e e m s tu me that :i t
the court m a k e s the d e c i s i o n , that under the
M a r t i n e z c a s e , that P a r a g r a p h 4 is v o i d . M a y b e
I can't m a k e that d e c i s i o n . M a y b e I have m a d e
it but m a y b e I can't m a k e it b e c a u s e m a y b e I
h a v e to say that should go up on appeal to be
changed.
But if that's the case, it seems to
me that yoi i are caught on the h o r n s of a
dilemma.
I'm either going to leave it in
effect and y o u can appeal
it, and get
it
changed, or I'm going to hold that the M a r t i n e z
case s a y s that, as it h o l d s , that you can't
award an interest in the m e d i c a l d e g r e e bi; it
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that the equitable restitution has to be
subject to it. For if it isn't going to take
something away and then not furnish the
substitute that has been provided in the case,
you can't have a half of the Martinez case.
You either get it or you don't.
And so if you're going to say that this
was improper under Martinez you're going to
have to accept the result of Martinez as far
as equitable restitution is concerned.
If
you're going to take the position that you
don't want Martinez' equitable restitution,
then I'm going to say we're not going to set
this aside. You can't have both."
(TR2 25:13-25 and 26:1-8)
"THE COURT: I don't care whether it was
appealed or not. You've got it back before me
and I can just simply say okay, we'll leave it
as it is, and if somebody else wants to appeal,
now you can go ahead and do it. I don't know.
But if that's the case, she has an interest in
his degree as set forth in this agreement or
in this decree; and that being the case, I'll
simply make a determination as to how much of
his income he'll pay to her each month.
I
mean, you just can't catch me in that. I'm not
going to take away one hand and take away with
the other hand because Martinez doesn't say
that and neither does this decision. You can't
have both sides with no benefit or with no
burden on the other side.
(TR2 26:14-25 and 27:1)
"...Now, I don't think I need to make any
determination as to what interest she has in
that degree. I think all we have to do is, she
had an interest and I'll make an award of
alimony.
Now, the question as to later on,
having done that, the question is with alimony
being tied to an interest in a degree, one is
something the court created and the other is
something he earned.
With the decree having created an interest
in his degree in the plaintiff, the question
then becomes, and I'm not going to answer it
20

today, as to whether or not that goes on ad
infinitum or whether i 1 ' n terminable in the
future."
ana
"THE COURT:
But I think, taking Mr.
Ericksen's view, that there was no pleading
and no claim of equ I table restitution, but
simply a seeking of an interest in the degree
and the court awarded it; that hasn't been
changed as of this point, Thei 1 we'll proceed
under that provision and we'll set alimony here
today. I'm not going to put a termination date
on i t. I wouldn't anyway.
And thei :i as time proceeds, we'll see
whether or not somebody wants to go up and let
the appellate court change that decision or
whether or not with the passage of time, the
parties can resolve it themselves. If not, it
will go on,
MR. HUGHES: My one thought, 1 agree wjth
everything, of course, the court says. But in
this case, equitable restitution is just
another term or subcategory, and I read it, for
the term alimony and allows the court to be
very creative,
THE COURT:

: aoree.

"MR . E R I C K S E N .
court's minute
# ## T h e
entry indicated that the co art would not find
equitable restitution, because the di vorce has
been tried and the facts leading up to the
divorce had been tried and heard by Judge
Conder. And I think it's inappropriate to put
in findings that in essence, this court retried
the divorce, especially in light of the fact
that the court held in the minute entry that
it would not consider the doctrine* of equitable
restitution
THE COURT: Let me tell you where I came
down on that one and you can tell me whether
you agree CJ I:-- t
. M, T find it necessary
%
to invoke * - * "•.?
ec;_. ; M C *-" restitution
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because I felt that the change of circumstances
alone were sufficient; so to the extent that
equitable restitution is spelled out in any one
of those paragraphs, it really wouldn't have
any bearing on it; however, I did feel that a
substantial portion of my decision was based
upon the background of this marriage and the
relative privation that the parties went
through; but in particular, the plaintiff. And
I!ll
be perfectly honest with you, the
continuing privation that she has. She and the
children have suffered since the time that the
defendant has divorced and established his
medical practice.
That, frankly, was a
substantial, moving motivation, the level of
which and one of the reasons for which I set
the figures where I did.
Now, I don't know that these facts are
anything other than just facts which have
background value partly upon which the thing
I have just explained is based, my decision.
MR. ERICKSEN: I guess it would be my
argument that if the court is going to go back
prior to the divorce and take from that period
of time the facts and that method or, you know,
thought process, it should be included in the
findings of fact.
And when I saw this, I guess the question
that I had was, I see the minute entry that
equitable restitution was not going to be
considered.
And when you look at equitable
restitution, really, that's an issue that she
should be restored as to what she has expended
in some form or other.
THE COURT: Or that she ought to share in
that which her labors produced.
MR. ERICKSEN:
Right.
And so when you
said that you weren't going to go that route,
but then you went and we have got facts that
go back prior to the divorce; it looks like in
fact that that's what it's aimed at.
Now, if it's a different animal, if it's
not the standard and the court in its minute
entry says basically that we're going to go
along w i t h —
22

THE COURT:

Change of circumstances.

MR. ERICKSEN; - -change of circumstances,
the standard type of situation and yet, it
doesn't follow the guidelines in the current
Supreme Court cases as to what you consider
when you arc? looking at modi : ications.
You
look from the decree forward. You look at the
standard of living at the time of the decree
a n d you 1 o o k a t t h e f i n. a n c i a I n e e d , a n d look
at the ability to pay at the time of the need
and look at how those have changed since the
time of the decree.
THE COURTi
That's basically
r ight.
Right,
I agree with that, Mr. Ericksen.
The
only value here is for a historical background
as to the financial 1 affairs of the parties, ..."
(TR3 ] 0 i 2 -2 5

11 1 2 5

12 i 1-14)

"THE COURT:
The thing that • 1 think
happened here, Mr. Ericksen, and maybe we ought
to straighten this up a little bit is, that in
e f f e ct, without t h I s decre e e v e r hav i ng been
the subject of an appellate decision; the
decision of Judge Conder
in awarding
an
interest ii I the doctor's medica1 degree to his
wife at the time of the divorce in which it's
clear to me, it was clear to me that Judge
Conder was looking and saying, there is nothing
in this marriage at this time and I can't take
care of the wife and children the way that they
ought to be taken care of because there isn't
enough income yet. But he has a degree that's
going to make him money.
So, I'm going to
award, and she helped him get that degree;
therefore, I'm going to award her an interest
in the degree.
That's what he said in his
decision. But then since that time, that basis
of a wifely interest or a spouse's interest in
the other's degree has been in effect overruled
by our appellate court.
And so I found that that being the case,
you're sort of back to ground one on what she's
e n t i 11 e d t o a t t h i s t i m e . ' *

(TR3 13:22-25, 14:1-16)

23

"MR. ERICKSEN: ...where Ifm coming from
and is kind of a two-pronged approach. Number
one, we didn!t know why Judge Conder did what
he did, there wasn't sufficient findings to
present that.
Could have been a couple of
attorneys that just basically, as part of the
packaging, that just put it in.
Second of all, there is no evidence
introduced in court as to why it was put in or
what it even meant. ,
Third of all, the court in its minute
entry basically said I am looking at the change
of circumstances since the date of the divorce
on the first page. And the court finds that
a substantial change of circumstances had
occurred in that the defendants income has
increased since the date of the divorce from
virtually nothing.
Then the court, using language like that
through its minute entry, was only looking at
the date of the decree forward. Then we have
findings that are replete with information that
goes back prior to the divorce and why certain
things were done, and the fact that she had
hardships and things prior to the divorce.
If the court is in fact basing its
decision on things that happened prior to the
divorce.
THE COURT: It really wasn't, except to
the extent that I thought it necessary to make
it clear that I was not following Judge
Conder's award of an interest in the degree
because I don't think under today's law that's
a valid decision.
MR. ERICKSEN:
Well, the court was
compensating in another way other than the
standard tradition.
THE COURT:
No, I wasnf t I was going
strictly at the time of the divorce, not the
current time...."
(TR3 14:19-25, 15:1-24)
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"THE COURT:
I f ve got a problem in that
in adjusting for the lack of an interest in
that degree, we still should show, because you
see, you take away something Judge Conder gave
her and I understand you say maybe the lawyers
did it; but the point of it is, once the Judge
has signed it, those are his findings, so you
have to say the Judge did it. I can only find
one real reason for that, whether or not it
was borne out in the minds of the lawyers, or
whether it was the judge's decision; once he
signed it, it becomes his and that is, it was
intended that she have a right in the future
to come back and receive some of the benefits
from the earnings from that degree.
I mean,
no o the r way t o i n t e rpre t the f i nd i ngs t ha t
she has a cont inu 11 1 g interest :i n that degree .
N o w i f y o 11 s a y , o r i f a 1 a w s a y s , w e J 1 ,
you can't do that, and I don't think equitable
restitution frankly was the answer, even though
our Court of Appeals has a real doozy of a
theory on that. But I do think that you can't
take it away with one hand and not give it back
with the other. You see what I'm saying?
So, yen i can't say she can't have her
interest in the degree without saying that
nevertheless it's perfectly obvious if you take
it away from her and don't make any adjustment
at the time of the original divorce, some
adjustment should be made at: til lis time.
I
guess that 's basicaJ ly what 1 ''in. sa^ ii lg .
You're saying you shouldn't go back beyond
1:1 ie date of the divorce ,
MR. ERICKSEN: Not only that, but I b;;:'t
think we ever came to court and said you
shouldn't take it away.
We came to court
saying there is no evidence. The plaintiff in
this case offered no evidence as to what the
percentage of the degree w a s , what it was worth
o r a n y t h i n g e 1 s e ; t h e r e f o r e , ,:i t: f a i 1 s .

THE COURT: W e i 1 , t here wasn't anything
within the decree itself tl lat sai ci, either.
It was very open-ended and I guess that's one
of the reasons that the evidence was put in
about the events that led up to the divorce.
And that is, the living conditions and her
contributions at that time was to try and

educate me, so that factor tells you what I'm
going to do, though."
(TR3 16:15-25, 17:1-25, 18:
"MR. ERICKSEN: Not only wasn't there any
length, there wasn't any argument as to the
amount.
THE COURT: Yeah, but you see, what I have
done in effect is, I converted that interest
that Judge Conder awarded, which now has been
held not to be proper from an interest in a
degree to an award of alimony.
And you are
probably right. It probably shouldn't go on
forever, although at the time that Judge Conder
awarded that decree, awarded alimony or the
right to alimony in this case, they were
awarding alimony forever.
So, I guess the
modification should have been to terminate
alimony at a given point."
(TR3 28:3
"THE COURT: Well, my point is this: If
we say the rights of these parties were fixed
by the '83 decree and Judge Conder says I'm
going to give her $10 a month or a hundred
dollars--"
(TR3 28:15
"THE COURT: — p e r month alimony because
you can't afford any more right now; under a
change of circumstances she can come back and
we'll talk about alimony and child support.
So, you come back and we talk about it and I
say, well, the award was an interest in the
degree--got
degree
and
decree
here—is
improper. But nevertheless, there has been a
substantial change of circumstances, so I'm
going to order some alimony. Then I award her
alimony, which is nothing other than an
expansion of the rights that Judge Conder
granted her to start with. But I expanded it
to the extent I did, because it was to take
care of the fact that the appellate court,
without ever knowing about this particular
case, took away her interest in that degree by
a decision in another case.
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S : , I have upped it and I've not said
anything about terminating because nobody
argued to me about whether it should be
terminated, Now, I suppose thaf -~ ~ legitimate
question to be considered a4 r^:n,^ p°-* "" ^ n
time.
(TR3 28:20- 25, 29: 1 12)
"THE COURT:
Both sides of this thing,
you're sort of getting hoist on your own
petard. To determine, Mr. Ericksen, when, if
ever, alimony should be reduced or terminated
in this case, I think you're right.
You're
going to have to go back and look at the whole
situation. It seems to me you can't determine
that alone and wouldn't be to your client's
best interest to do it, I don't think, to
determine it alone solely from the date of the
divorce on. I think to be equitable about it,
you're going to have to go back and look at the
whole factual situation surrounding
this
marriage in order to make a time definition of
what in effect is an award of alimony to take
care of the interest that the plaintiff has or
had in the earning abi lity she helped provide
for the defendant.
I suppose, because we tried the case
almost from scratch, I mean, all of the
background and history came in and everything,
I suppose I could make some ki nd of a
determination on that today...."
(TR3 29:23-25, 30:1- 15)
"MR. ERICKSEN:
I think we should, and
the other question is, that still isn't clear,
is the court saying that Judge Conder awarded
alimony in the form of the degree and pegged
that value of that at $10 or is this a separate
animal? Do we have the degree on one hand and
$10 alimony on i the other hand, mutually
independent?
THE COURT: I think what he is saying is
there isn't enough money to pay alimony, so
gee, I'm going to award $10, and obviously the
marriage that existed for rs^r w ; > '"• * • .:nder
the circumstance.- tr.a* e>:i^ie-i VJ . t \ Tnat

marriage at that date could have been paid, and
if alimony could have been paid, it was
completely inadequate as an award.
And he
thought he was giving her a right because he
spelled it out in the decree—a right to come
back for additional alimony, and child support,
and an interest in that medical degree.
And what I would think he was saying, I
mean, I don ! t know how else to interpret it
because she has an interest in that when he
starts earning more money; she's entitled to
something, and she's entitled to be supported
better and so are those children. And what I
have said, well, why if it's the issue of
whether or not she has an interest in it or
whether or not she doesn't under current law,
let's award an adequate alimony figure based
upon what I found to be adequate money to pay
for it. But I didn't cut it off, and I agree
with you, I did not, and I'll be further honest
with you, I really didn't give that a great
deal of thought because of two factors. One,
it wasn't argued or suggested, and secondly,
you sort of have thoughts in the back of your
head, and I recognize this costs time and
money, but sometimes you have to do this."
(TR3 30:23-25, 31:1-25, 32:1
The court converted the interest in the degree to
award of alimony because it found that:
"It was intended that she have a right in
the future to come back and receive some
benefits from the earnings from the degree.
I mean no other way to interpret the findings
that she has a continuing interest in that
degree."
(TR3 16:24-25 and 17:
This exclamation was in direct contradiction to the f
that the same? language had been interlined out of the decree
Judge Conder.

(See Exhibit "A" . )
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This approach was reversible error and an abuse of the
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THE TRIAL COURTS AMENDED FINDING:* uu FACT ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
TRIAL.

-J

. .

o f w 1: 1 a

Attached as Exhibit "C" in the amended findings of fact
and order, defendant argues that the findings of fact are not
supported by the evidence,
"Finding No. 10:

The court finds that the plaintiff and the minor

children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the
divorce."
There is nothing in the record that would support this
finding.
"Finding No. 12:

The plaintiff

intends to continue with her

education in an effort to maximize her income potential.

The

testimony

and

evidence

the

prospects

of

the

employment
education

in her
and

that

admitted

plaintiff
field

will

at

finding
be

trial

indicates

well-paid

difficult

even with additional

and

that

full-time

without

additional

education,

employment

opportunities are projected to be limited in the future."
The evidence does not support this finding as there is
nothing in the record that plaintiff has applied for any jobs nor
was expert testimony presented as to job availability.
"Finding No. 16:

The earnings of the defendant as well as his

future potential have been considered by the court for the purpose
of determining whether the amount of alimony should be modified."
No

evidence

was

placed

into

defendant's future potential earnings.
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the

record

respecting

"Finding No. 17: The defendant's present income is not completely
clear but the court finds based upon the evidence that his gross
income can be interpreted as being as high as $224,000.00 a year
but

certainly

under

no

circumstances

less

than

approximately

$120,000.00 per year."
There is absolutely no basis or evidence whereby the
court could come up with those figures.
"Finding No. 19 : The court finds that there has been a substantial
change of circumstances in the parties income since the time of the
divorce."
The court does not specify with precision what the change
of

circumstances

are.

As such

it

is reversible

error

Jones

(Supra).
"Finding No. 21 :

Based upon the change of circumstances and the

needs of the children, child support to be paid by the defendant
should be increased to the appropriate amount reflected in the
judicial district's support guidelines."
Plaintiff
foundational

did

amounts

not

that

put

would

into

evidence

allow

anyone

the
to

requisite
complete

a

worksheet.
The finding should specify the evidence presented and
why the child support awarded is the appropriate amount.
"Finding

No.

27:

The

court

finds

that

at

the

time

of

modification hearing, there has been a substantial change in
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the

circumstances of the parties, that the plaintiff has a real and
substantial

need

for an

increase

in alimony and

that she has

endured substantial and significant personal hardships since the
time of the divorce."
The finding does not indicate that the court analyzed
the three (3) factors in Jones (Supra) and is therefore fatally
defective.
"Finding No. 28:

The court finds that it is just and equitable

that

alimony

the monthly

to be paid

by the defendant

to

the

plaintiff should be increased from $10.00 to the sum of $1,350.00
per month.

Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989."
The

calculation

finding

as

does

not

include

any

basis, method

or

to how the sum of $1,350.00 was arrived at other

than it is the figure contained in plaintiff!s amended petition.
"Finding No. 29 : The court further finds that the defendant should
be required to provide health and dental insurance for the minor
children of

the parties.

The court

further

finds that it is

equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including
orthodontic expenses, not paid by health and dental

insurance

should be divided equally between the parties."
There was no evidence as to cost, availability or need
placed in the record.
"Finding No. 30:

The court finds that attorneys fees should be

awarded to the plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable
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attorneys

fees would

be

the sum

of

$4,394.00 plus

her

costs

incurred herein."
The $4,394.00 figure is based on a supplemental pleading
filed 10-days after the trial ended.

Because it was not properly

included in the record, nor is there evidence it was even requested
by the court, this finding is without support in the record of the
trial.
"Finding No. 31:

The court finds that the plaintifffs counsel's

fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering
the length of time expended and the complexities of the issues,
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable."
The

finding

does

not

include

the

standard

in

the

community nor was there one scintilla of evidence in the record
that would support this finding.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING PLAINTIFF AN INCREASE OF $1,547.00
PER MONTH CHILD SUPPORT.
A.

The evidence does not support the finding of $1,547.00

per month child support.
The plaintiff in presentation of her case did not present
any evidence of the amount needed for child support.
She did not produce a child support worksheet until after
the trial was through.

(TR2 112:15-16)
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The worksheet was allowed
defendant.

over

the objection of

the

The court's ruling was that the court could accept the

worksheet at any time.
Defendants objection was that there was no foundation
for the figures used to compose the worksheet nor an opportunity
by defendant to challenge those figures.
If plaintiff had properly
there

would

have

been

proper

introduced

foundation

used

the figures and
to

compose

worksheet then the issue would have been different.

the

Because the

trial court awarded the plaintiff the support figures contained on
the plaintiff's worksheet, the same constitutes reversible error.
B.

The

findings

do not

indicate

the

reason

that

child

raised

child

support was set at $1,638.00 per month.
In the

court's minute

support

to

$1,547.00

per

drafted

findings, raised

entry

month, yet

the

court

plaintiff's

it to $1,6388.00 without

counsel, who
explanation,

basis or finding.
C.

The child support was inequitable.
For the same reasons as iterated in defendant's arguments

for

reversal,

including

the

defendant

would

fact

no amount

that

argue

the

same

arguments

was given at

here

the close of

plaintiff's case.
In the event the court did find change of circumstances
to justify an increase in child support, the court should have
increased child support to a total of $1,044.00 per month based on
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the

only

evidence

presented

by

defendant

and

the

worksheet

introduced by defendant into evidence.
D.

The court ordered defendant to maintain health insurance

without considering its effect on child support on the ability of
defendant to pay.
There

was

no

evidence

of

any

of

these

elements

by

plaintiff nor any findings supporting the same.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR J.N.O.V.
Rule 50(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
11

(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed
verdict made at the close of all the evidence
is denied or for any reason is not granted,
the court is deemed to have submitted the
action to the jury subject to a latter
determination of the legal questions raised by
the motion...."
Upon

the

conclusion

of

plaintiff's

case,

brought the following motion:
"MR. ERICKSEN: Your Honor, I think we
would like to bring a motion to dismiss and we
base this on a couple of things.
First of all, there's been no evidence
before the Court of any amount whatsoever; and
that the Court, as far as the alimony, no
evidence before the Court at all of any
evidence of value, or amounts that the
plaintiff has there and that the plaintiff is
asking. We've heard testimony of some need,
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defendant

that the house is in disrepair, but been no
value or basis.
I've got a copy of a transcript of Mrs.
Foxley's last court appearance. And I don't
find anything in there on which a Court can
base a decision on an amount. The plaintiff
has not put into evidence any child support
schedule and the plaintiff has not requested
or proved any amount; therefore, based on that
fact, the Court should dismiss the petition.
The plaintiff, in addition, has not put on any
evidence of value of the medical degree and
been no economic expert, been no testimony as
to an opinion or value; therefore, the Court
cannot make a decision on value because there
is no evidence in the record.
THE COURT:
I am afraid Ifve got to
disagree, Mr. Ericksen.
My notes reveal, and
my memory tells me that the testimony was —
well, it showed about a $1,371.00 a month
expense for the family and her testimony was
that's probably about what she cleared.
Further, the testimony is, or the procedure
here is based upon your position that there has
been no pleading for equitable restitution, and
therefore, Paragraph 4 should remain in effect.
If Paragraph 4 remains in effect, then
clearly, giving it meaning there is a provision
that there will be a right of review in this
matter. And under the law, there is anyway.
But specifically, that the question of alimony
should be reviewed when there has been a
material change in circumstances of the
parties. The testimony is here that there has
been a change of material circumstances in the
doctor's income.
There is also a continuing material change
with the children being older and their demands
increasing. That's even more borne out to a
certain extent and supported even by the
testimony that came in today regarding, at
least the evidence regarding the payment on
the house.
I think that we need to resolve the matter
and even assuming your position were correct
at this point, if I were to take that position
and dismiss this petition here today, there
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would not be a thing in the world to prevent
the plaintiff from turning around and re-filing
tomorrow and coming right back and go clear
through this thing clear over again.
That
f
would be a waste of everyone s time and effort.
We ought to try and resolve this issue
hopefully on a long-term basis so the parties
can get back to living and quit fighting.
So I am going to deny the motion at this
time."
(TR2 50:1-25, 51:1-25, and 52:1-3)
Even assuming that the court was correct in regards to
change of circumstances there was absolutely no evidence of what
constituted a sufficient amount to meet plaintiff1s needs.
The court erred in not granting defendants motion.
VI.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES.
A.

The plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence whatso-

ever that would support an award of attorneys

fees, including

Findings 30 and 31.
At the end of trial plaintiff made a proffer over the
objection of the defendant of attorneys fees.
115:1-9)

(TR2 114:7-25 and

(See attached Exhibit "D".)
Plaintiff proffered that attorneys fees were $3,000.00.

(TR2 115:1-4)
This amount was admitted over objection of defendant.
(See Exhibit "E".)
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Ten days after the trial counsel for defendant received
a 3-page document, dated March 16, 1989, entitled supplement to
attorneys fees of Robert Hughes.

(See Exhibit

!f !f

F . )

The document was not in affidavit form and instead of a
$3,000.00 previous balance showed a balance of $3,180.00,
The amount due on the bottom of the statement attachment
was $4,394.25.
This is the figure that the court used in its award of
attorneys fees.
B.

The court abused its discretion in using the supplement

submitted 10 days after trial to award attorneys fees.
The current status of the law in Utah is that an award
of attorneys fees must be based on evidence showing first that
there is financial need of the person receiving the award and
second that the award is reasonable.

Porco v. Porco, 752 P2d 365

(Utah App. 1988)
In Talley v. Talley, 739 P2d 83 (Utah App. 1987) the
court reversed an award of attorneys fees when the wife's counsel
proffered testimony and produced an exhibit itemizing the
and

costs

expended

and

the hourly

rates

charged.

The

time
court

reversed the award of attorneys fees because there was no evidence
regarding the "...necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of
the case and

the result

accomplished,

and

the

charged for divorce action in the community....11
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rates

commonly

Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980)
Huck v. Huck, 734 P2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986)
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 769 P2d 820 (Utah App. 1989)

This case is further off the mark because not only wasn't
there evidence introduced that caused reversal in Talley (Supra),
the evidence was not introduced at trial so that defendant had an
opportunity to cross-examine it.
As a result, the court should reverse the court's award
of attorneys fees.
C.
element

The amended findings of fact do not contain the critical
finding that the plaintiff

is in financial need.

The

plaintiff did not put on one scintilla of evidence evidencing that
she was unable to pay her attorneys fees.
The request for attorneys fees must be accompanied by
evidence at trial as to the nature and amount of such fees.
Warren v. Warren, 655 P2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982)
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P2d 1076 (Utah 1988)
It is reversible error not to make specific
outlining

the standard

required

findings

to be awarded attorneys

fees.

Acton (Supra).
The court should reverse the award of attorneys fees to
plaintiff.
D.

Plaintiff has failed to submit an affidavit of costs

leaving the findings vague and ambiguous.
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Plaintiff

is required by Rule 54(d)(2) Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure to submit an affidavit of costs within five (5)
days of judgment if they are to be awarded.
The supplement includes costs on its face.
Because plaintiff did not comply with Rule 54(d)(2) the
entire award should be set aside because it appears that costs and
attorneys fees are intermixed.
VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT A
NEW TRIAL.
Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions
of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all
or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues, for any of the following causes...
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of
the...adverse party...
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material
for the party making the application, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial...
(6)
Insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict or other decision, or that
it is against law....11
A,

Plaintiff committed perjury at trial.
The defendant in a post judgment motion presented the

court

with

affidavits

by

one

Robert

Farr

(Exhibit

"G")

that

Plaintiff had committed perjury at trial in at least the following
particulars:
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1.

Plaintiff in discovery and at trial represented that

she had one bank account when she in fact had a secret bank account
that she ran money through.

(TR1 59:1-3)

Defendant alleges that an attorney that plaintiff
socialized with advised her not to disclose the existence of the
account.
2.
asked

Plaintiff

plaintiff

disclose

that

in discovery and at the time of trial

to disclose
she

had

her assets.

purchased

an

Plaintiff

airplane

having

failed

to

invested

$4,500.00 in said asset.
Defendant claimed that this fact was material as
plaintiff represented that she was in need and that her home was
in substantial disrepair and that she could not pay her mortgage
or property taxes.
3.

Plaintiff in discovery and in trial represented that

her home was in substantial disrepair and that she did not have
adequate funds to repair the same.
bill

to the underlying

After trial she submitted a

mortgage holder

that

$19,000.00 towards improvements on the home.
attached.)

she had

expended

(See Exhibit "H"

This is perjury on its face.
Because of these irregularities by the adverse party the

Judge should have held plaintiff in contempt of court and ordered
a new trial or dismissed plaintiff!s petition.
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B.

The

affidavit

of

Farr

represents

newly

discovered

evidence which was material and not discoverable after reasonable
diligence.
Even assuming that defendant did not commit perjury the
above evidence would

constitute new evidence not available at

trial .
In

Defendant's

motion

for

new

trial

based

on

the

foregoing defendant was asked why he could not have discovered that
plaintiff had purchased an airplane for $4,500.00.
Defendant responded by indicating to the court that three
(3) weeks after the trial defendant's counsel was contacted by a
person whom plaintiff was suing over the plane.

(TR3 157:7-16)

See Exhibit "I" submitted on defendant's motion for new trial.
It is interesting to note that the complaint was filed
but not served until three (3) days after the trial was completed.
(See Exhibit "J" attached.)
Plaintiff's response is contained in the transcript and
her counsel characterizes the airplane situation as "...a more
thorny issue" (TR3 53:7-8) and argues if there was error in failure
to disclose it should be harmless error.
Defendant would emphatically emphasize that one of the
major issues was the need of the plaintiff.

Certainly

if the

plaintiff shelled out $4,500.00 for an airplane, $19,000.00 for
home improvements, intentional failure to disclose these items is
not harmless error.
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The plaintiff committed perjury on the face of the record
according to her own attorney's representations:
"...Mr. Ericksen did
interest in any business
no. And did anybody owe
client put just, I think,

ask, do you have an
and my client said
you any money. My
Dr. Foxley.11
(TR3 53:9-12)

VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE SHOULD
DISQUALIFIED TO HEAR THIS MATTER.

HAVE

BEEN

The defendant filed a motion to recuse the judge based
on what was perceived as a bias to grant plaintiff relief without
supporting evidence.
Based on a review of the record, it would appear that
Judge Moffat ignored standards enunciated in determining alimony,
child support and attorneys fees.
The defendant's motion should have been granted.

CONCLUSION
I.
The court committed reversible error by allowing evidence
of the conduct of the parties prior to the divorce.

The court in

essence retried the divorce substituting its own impressions to
fill in inadequacies contained in the original decree of divorce.
The

court

then

found

that

there

was

substantial

circumstances that was not supported by the evidence.
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change

of

The

original

decree

should

have

been

considered

Res

Judicata and the court should not have substituted new findings
for those contained in the decree.
It is reversible error to do so.
II.
The court abused its discretion in increasing alimony
from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per month.
The court in effect applied a legal reason for increasing
alimony without

considering

the standard

as

iterated

in Jones

(Supra) and without finding any evidence of value or amount needed
by the requesting spouse that was supported by the evidence or
included in findings of fact.
It was reversible error for the court not to include in
its findings sufficient evidence that would enable a reviewing
court to determine the underlying rationale for the finding.
Ill.
The court's findings were not supported by evidence.
IV.
The evidence presented at trial was deficient in that no
amount was ever identified as the amount needed for the children's
care.
Plaintiff did not place into evidence a child support
worksheet until after trial and then the necessary foundation was
lacking.
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Defendant argues that the submission of the child support
schedule without the foundational evidence for the amounts used is
reversible error.
V.
The plaintiff submitted no evidence supporting any amount
claimed for alimony, child support or attorneys fees.

The court

should have granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict and
subsequent J.N.0.V.
VI.
The plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of attorneys
fees at trial.
The basis for the court's award was a document submitted
10-days after trial which did not meet the standard enunciated in
Talley (Supra).
VII.
The plaintiff committed perjury at trial by failing to
disclose she had multiple bank accounts, that she has invested
$4,500.00 in an airplane and $19,000.00 in her home, all the while
claiming she was destitute.
The foregoing also constitutes newly discovered evidence
which was material to defendant's case and which he could not have
discovered.
The same argument applies to child support.
Defendant should have been granted a new trial.
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VIII.
The trial judge should have excused himself from this
case
DATED this

day of November, 1989.

-5^/^/^f

-^ cc/~/rX"S>->n

GREG S. ERICKSEN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellani
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THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR.
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
DEANNA FOXLEY,
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. D82-1591

WILLIAM N. FOXLEY,
Defendant.
-oooOooo-

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge of the above-entitled
Court, on Thursday, the 30th day of June, 1983, at the hour of
10:00 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and through her
attorney, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and the defendant not appearing
in person but through his attorney, Rulon R. Price, and the
Court having heard the stipulations of counsel, having heard the
sworn testimony of the plaintiff, having received proffers of
proof from both counsel, having received documentary evidence,
having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed the
contents of the Court's file, and good cause appearing therefor,

-1-

Iand having heretofore made and entered the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law;
NOW, THEREFORE;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore
existing between the parties are dissolved, and a Decree of
Divorce is granted to the plaintiff, to become final three months
from the date of entry hereof.
2.

That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and

control of the four minor children, subject to reasonable rights
of visitation in the defendant, and while the defendant is
rcoiding outoide the State of Utah, -ho io awarded telephone
visitation with the minor children and his mother is awarded
liberal and fair visitation with the minor children.

That both

parties are ordered to attend counselling concerning their
relationship with the minor children and for the benefit of the
minor children.
3.

That the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff

child support in the sum of $150.00 per month per child, $600.00
in the aggregate, through the clerk of the Court, until the

m

minor children reach the age of maiority.
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4.

That the plaintiff io awarded an interest in

defendant's medical degree, and is awarded the sum of $10.00 per
month as alimony, and that at such time as tho defendant's

i>ee*(

A

m*LT<*£(*Li
Cka+ife.
7/ f ^

i** a team*/**«*<*

/ -rii*.
f*# paying a greater amount of alimony; tho
income
will Gupport
-20

srurs,

a~f

Ctt\/<1 S«//9£r

AHJ/O /£

ff ohall bo entitled to oook a greater amount of alimony
from the Court*
5.

That the plaintiff is awarded the home of the parties

located at 735 Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with
all equity therein, and the defendant is ordered to execute a
Quit Claim Deed, conveying all of his interest in said property
to the plaintiff.
6.

That the plaintiff is awarded the 1976 Toyota pick-up

truck, and the defendant is awarded the 1973 MG Midget automobile
and each party is ordered to execute vehicle titles or other
documents to effect the transfer of said vehicles.
7.

That each party is awarded the personal property

currently in his or her possession, except that the defendant is
awarded the following property currently in the possession of
the plaintiff:

black camera case with contents, silver camera

case with contents, tripod, enlarger, antique clock, red
petrified stump, oak bench, any rifles in the possession of the
plaintiff, his rocks, minerals and fossils owned prior to the
marriage, one-half of rocks, minerals and fossils acquired during
the marriage, all small antiques including waffle iron, insulators)
and old irons, walnut coffee table, black rocking chair, medical
books and other personal books, two boxes of antique books, and
the coin collection including all paper money; the plaintiff is
awarded the following personal property currently in the
possession on the defendant:

camping equipment consisting of
-3-

I
two sleeping bags, a Coleman stove, and a Coleman lantern; and
the tools are awarded to the plaintiff for her use for three
months and then are ordered divided between the parties, or
the plaintiff shall give the defendant a $100.00 credit and
retain possession of the tools. That the furniture belonging to j
the plaintiff from prior to the marriage which is in storage is
awarded to the plaintiff, and the defendant is ordered to make
arrangements to convey possession of that property to the
plaintiff.

That the plaintifffs saving certificate consisting of Ij

money received from the sale of her home prior to the marriage

l

is awarded to the plaintiff.
8.

That the plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the

mortgage arrearages existing on the home of the parties and hold
the defendant harmless therefrom, and the defendant is ordered

l

to assume and pay all of his student loans and the Visa account
and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom.
9.

That both parties are ordered to obtain and maintain

health and accident insurance for the benefit of the minor
children of the parties if such insurance is available through
his or her employment.
10.

That the defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain

life insurance on his life, if life insurance is available througli
his employment as a group plan with either the minor children as
beneficiaries or with a bank or similar financial institution
as trustee for the benefit of the minor children.
-4-

11.

That the defendant is ordered to pay the sum of

$1,500-00 to the plaintiff for her reasonable attorney's fees*
DATED this

M ^ day of

[A U %

, 19#3.

^

BY THE COURT:
l

Distriqt Judge

Approved as to f gxjn: 0^4^,

-5-
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MAR 2 1 1989

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY

MINUTE ENTRY
Civil No. 824901591

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing before the Court based on the plaintiff's Petition to
Modify the Decree of Divorce to seek an increase in alimony and
child support, and testimony having been taken and evidence
admitted, argument to the Court having been made, and the Court
being fully advised in the premises makes this its
DECISION
The Court finds that a substantial change of circumstance
has occured in that the defendant's income has increased since the
date of divorce from virtually nothing or approximately $50 per
month to a figure which is not completely clear but which can be

interpreted as being as high as $224,000 a year and certainly under
no circumstances less than approximately $120,000 per year. The
Court further finds that the plaintiff has done an admirable job of
caring for herself and the children under very adverse
circumstances and in educating and raising said children.

She also

has been struggling to obtain her own education to aid in the
support of the children.

The Court finds that the sum of $1,547

per month is the correct amount for child support and the sum of
$1,350 per month is fair and equitable as alimony.

The Court

further finds that the defendant should be required to provide
health and dental insurance for the minor children of the parties
and he is hereby ordered to do so.
The Court does not find it necessary to invoke the recently
declared novel theory of "equitable restitution" as enunciated by
the Utah Court of Appeals nor is it necessary to invoke the
provisions of the divorce decree wherein Judge Condor awarded an
interest in the defendant's medical degree to the plaintiff.

The

Court finds that the change of circumstances above set forth are
sufficient to justify the award herein without further findings
regarding the questions relating to the defendant's medical
degree.

Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded to the

plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney's fee is as
set forth in the affidavits provided by plaintiff's attorneys in
the sum of $4,394 plus her costs incurred herein.

-2-

Plaintiff's

attorney will draft appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and amended decree to^mplement this decision.
Dated this

-2/

day of March, 1989.

1
District^

-3-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

$ t

day of March, 1989:

Robert W. Hughes
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Greg S. Ericksen
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010

l^cylky ^re-V-gfO^

TabC

J U L - 6 1989

ROBERT W. HUGHES (1573)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)534-1074

S A L T LAKc iJOU i i V

By.

~/aZty ~^&immJ

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY

r

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

/

Plaintiff,

)

CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

vs.
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

WILLIAM N. FOXLEY,

)

Defendant.

)

THIS MATTER came on for trial on September 22, 1988, at the
hour of 2:00 p.m. and was subsequently continued to March 7 f 1989
at

the hour of 10:00 a.m. on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify a

Decree of Divorce before the Honorable Richard H. Moffatt, Judge
of

the

above-entitled

Court,

sitting

without

jury.

The

Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, was represented by Robert W. Hughes and
the Defendant, William

N. Foxley, was represented by Greg S.

Ericksen.
The Court having heard

testimony

and received evidence,

argument to the Court having been made, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises is now prepared to enter its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married October 8,
1

1976.

At

the

time of

the marriage,

the Plaintiff

was an

undergraduate student and the Defendant was a graduate student at
Boise State University.
2.

The divorce trial was heard on June 30, 1983, a Decree

of Divorce was signed on August 22, 1983 and entered on August
23, 1983 to become final three months from the time of entry.
3.

At

the

time

of

the

divorce,

the

Plaintiff

was

unemployed and had no income and the Defendant was a student and
had an income, not including amounts received from student loans,
of approximately $50.00 per month.
4.

That at the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff had

expenses of $1,070.00 per month, the Defendant had expenses of
$895.00 per month.
5.

The Defendant graduated

from the University of Utah

Medical School in June of 1983.
6.

During the parties marriage the parties had four minor

children to wit:
was

Christine, born September 19, 1970.

(Christine

the daughter of the Plaintiff by a prior marriage who was

adopted by the Defendant

in October of 1980.); Sarah, born May

23, 1977; Noall, born July 13, 1979; and Corinne, born April 15,
1982 .
7.

During the marriage, the Plaintiff could not pursue her

formal education due to frequent relocations of the Defendant in
pursuing his medical career, because Plaintiff was employed at

2

various times during the marriage to assist in the support of the
family, and due to the fact that Plaintiff was pregnant for a
major portion of the time.
The

parties

acquired

few

household

furnishings,

appliances or other personal property during the marriage.
(J?/

For approximately the two years after the parties were

divorced, the Plaintiff and the parties minor children required
and received public assistance.
f 9.
admirable

The

Court

finds

job of caring

that

the

Plaintiff

for and educating

has done

an

the parties minor

children.
HO)

The

Court

finds

that

the Plaintiff

and

the

minor

children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the
divorce.
11.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has made significant

personal sacrifices to further her education since the time of
the divorce.

After the divorce, Plaintiff obtained her bachelors

degree in Sociology and expects to receive her masters degree in
1989.

Plaintiff anticipates pursuing a Ph.D.

:ompletion

of

this

Length of time for

course of study will depend

on

course

requirements
y /^
/

** 12.

The Plaintiff intends to continue with her education in

an effort to maximize her income potential.

The testimony and

evidence admitted at trial indicates that the prospects of the
Plaintiff finding well-paid and full-time employment in her field
will be difficult without additional education and that even with
3

additional education, employment opportunities are projected to
be limited in the future.
13.

During the year 1987, the Plaintiff worked as a part-

time employee and had a gross income of $9,600.00.
14.

In 1987, the Defendant moved to Winslow, Arizona where

he is the only medical doctor who specializes in obstetrics and
gynecology in that vicinity.
15.

During the year 1987, the last year which the Defendant

was able

to provide a tax return, the Defendant had a gross

income of $128,437.00.

The Defendant's 1987 income was comprised

of wages he received $16,031.00 as an employee, for approximately
6 months, at the Huerly Medical Center in Michigan, and from the
private practice of medicine.

The Defendant earned $112,406.00

from his private medical practice in approximately 6 months of
practice.
16.

The earnings of the Defendant as well ^s his -fuXur-e

potential have been considered by the court for the purpose of
determining whether the amcumt of alimony should be modified.
17.

The Defendant's present income is not completely clear

but the Court finds based upon the evidence that his gross income
can be interpreted as being as high as $224,000.00 a year but
certainly

under

no

circumstances

less

than

approximately

$120,000.00 per year.
18.

The Defendant was able to contribute $41,660.00 to a

Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987 and he anticipated contributing a
similar amount to a retirement plan in 1988.
4

19.

The Court

finds that

there has been a substantial

change of circumstances in the parties income since the time of
the divorce.
20.

Based upon the changes of circumstances, a modification

of the decree of divorce
however, find

is warranted.

The Court does not,

it necessary to invoke the theory of

"Equitable

Restitution" as annunciated by the Utah Courts of Appeals nor is
it necessary

to the Court

to invoke

the provisions

of

the

original divorce decree, wherein Judge Condor awarded an interest
in the Defendant's medical degree to the Plaintiff, since the
change of circumstances and the needs of the Plaintiff and the
minor children are sufficient to justify a modification of the
decree.
21.

Based upon the change of circumstances and the needs of

the children, child support to be paid by the Defendant should be
increased

to the appropriate amount reflected in the judicial

district's support guidelines.
22.
gross

The Court

part-time

finds that

income

of

the Plaintiff has an adjusted

$800.00

per

month

and

that

the

Defendant has an adjusted gross income, after the subtractions of
his minimum necessary expenses, in excess of $6,985.00 per month.
23.

The proportionate share of the parties combined income

is 10* and 90* for the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively.
24.

The Court

finds that based upon the Plaintiff fs and

Defendant's combined adjusted gross incomes, the amount of child
support per child should be the sum of $607.00 per month for the
5

minor

children Sarah and Noall and should be the amount of

$504.00

for the parties youngest child, Corinne, for a total

child support amount of $1,718.00, monthly, for all three minor
children.
should

The Defendant, pursuant to the support guidelines,

pay to the Plaintiff

support.
support

The Court

further

the sum of $1,549.00

for child

finds that the amount of child

for Corinne should increase to the sum of $607.00 per

month beginning on April 15, 1989, since she will be 7 years of
age on that date.

Therefore, beginning on April 15, 1989, the

Defendants child support obligation will increase to $1,638.00
per month, $546.00 per month per minor child.
25.

The Court further finds that pursuant to the support

guidelines, the child support to be paid by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff should be decreased by 25* during those periods which
the Defendant has extended visitation of 25 consecutive or more
days with the minor child(ren).
26.

The Court

finds that at the time of the hearing the

Plaintiff was in arrears in property taxes for her residence in
excess of $3,000.00 and that they Plaint iff' s residence was in
jeopardy
that

of being sold by the county for back property taxes;

the Plaintiff

is nine payments behind on her

mortgage

payments, that the Plj*vnMff has incurred substantial debts for
medical^ _dental_ .and orthodontic expenses for the children; that
the home where the Plaintiff and the minor children reside is in
poor condition and is in need of substantial and major repairs,
including repairs to the roof, foundation,/ interior and exterior
6

walls and plumbing, rebuilding of the back entry into the home,
as well

as other

repairs; and,

that

the Plaintiff

and

the

children are in need of new appliances and household furnishings,
including beds, furniture, a washer and dryer, a stove and also.
new clothing and shoes.

_.- -- —

~

~~

~

~ "

The Plaintiff is currently living in the same home as
when the Decree was entered.
27.

The Court finds that at the time of the modification

hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of
the parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial
and significant personal hardships since the time of the divorce.
28.

The Court finds that it is just and equitable that the

monthly alimony, to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff
should

be

increased

from

$10.00

to the sum of $1,350.00 per

month.

Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989.

29.

The Court further finds that the Defendant should be

required

to provide health and dental insurance for the minor

children of

the parties.

The Court further finds that it is

equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including
orthodontic

expenses, not paid by health and dental

insurance

should be divided equally between the parties.
30.

The Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded

to the Plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney!s
fees would be the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs
herein.
7

incurred

31.

The Court

finds that that the Plaintiff's Counsel's

fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering
the length of time expended and the complexities of the issues,
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable.
32.
ba

That tha Court did not consider whether alimony should

tarainatad

but

would

entertain

further

hearing

upon

application of althar party or future petitions for modification.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
aince

There has been a substantial change of circumstances

the Decree of Divorce was originally

entered

in this

matter.
2.

It is fair and reasonable, based upon the change of

circumstances, that the amount of child support to be paid by the
Defendant should be increased in accordance with the schedules
set forth in the child support guidelines.
3.

The child support to be paid by the Defendant to the

Plaintiff

for support

of the parties minor children

should

increase to the amount of $1,549.00 per month for the three minor
children.

The amount

of child

support

to be paid

by

the

Defendant to the Plaintiff for the support of the parties minor
children should

be

increased

to the amount of $1,638.00 per

month, $546.00 per child per month, beginning April 15, 1989.
4.

The Plaintiff

has

endured

and continues

to endure

significant and substantial hardships and has made significant
and substantial sacrifices since the time of the divorce and she
8

has a significant and substantial need at present and in the
future for an increase in alimony.
5.

It is fair and reasonable that the amount of alimony

payable from the Defendant to the Plaintiff be increased to
$1,350.00 per month, commencing April 19, 1989.
6.

The Defendant should provide health, accident and

dental insurance for the parties minor children and any medical
and dental costs, including orthodontic treatments, which are not
paid by medical insurance shall be divided equally between the
parties.
7.

It is just and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded

attorney's fees in the amount of $4,394.00 plus costs incurred
herein.
DATED this

0FFAT
URT JUDGE

"^
Robert W. H U A M ^
y
f
o
y
>
P
l
a
i
n
t
i:
Atto>r\ney

'GregHB. //fericJcsen
Attorney for Defendant
MISC:Foxley
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Tli;ru JjJiCc.i 0'i.tncf

Robert W. Hughes (1573)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 \
Telephone: (801) 534-1074 '% y

APR 1 ' 1989

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff,

MODIFICATION OF DECREE
OF DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT

&\v> H

vs.
WILLIAM M. FOXLF.Y ,
Defendant.

Civil No: D82-1591
Judae Richard H. Moffat

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing before the Court, based upon the plaintiffs petition to
modify the decree of divorce.

The plaintiff was present at the

hearing and represented by counsel, Robert W. Hughes.

The

defendant was also present at the hearing and represented by
counsel, Greg S. Ericksen.
The Court having received testimony and admitted
evidence, argument to the court having been made and the Court
being fully advised on the premises and based upon the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously entered herein,
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.
follows.

The Decree of Divorce should be modified as

Paragraph 3 of the orginal Decree of Divorce states:
"3. That the defendant is Ordered to pay the plaintiff
child support in the sum of $150.00 per month, per
child, $600.00 in the aggregrate through the Clerk of
the Court, until the minor children reach the age of
majority. fl

This paragraph of the orginal Decree of Divorce is hereby
as follows:
"3. That the defendant is hereby Ordered to pay the
plaintiff child support in the sum of $1,547*00 per month. The
amount of child support payable from the defendant to the
plaintiff shall be increased to the sum of $1,638.00 per month,
which represents $546.00 per month per minor child, beginning
April 15, 1989.
(2)

Paragraph 4 of the original Decree of Divorce

states :
"4. That the plaintiff has an interest in the
defendants medical degree, and is awarded the sum of
$10.00 per month as alimony, and that at such time as
there has been a material change in circumstance of the
parties, the issue of child support and/or alimony may
be reviewed. !l
This paragraph of the original decree of divorce is hereby
modified as follows:
"4. That the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the
sum of $1,350.00 per month as and for alimony until further Order
of this Court.
(3)

Paragraph 9 of the original Decree of Divorce

states:
"9. That both parties are Order to obtain and maintain
health and accident insurance for the benefit of the
minor children of the parties if such insurance is
available through his or her employment."
This paragraph of the orginal decree of divorce is hereby
modified as follows:
9. That the defendant shall provide health and dental
insurance for the minor children of the parties and is hereby
specifically Ordered to do so. Any medical or dental expenses,
including orthodonic expenses not paid by health insurance shall
be divided equally between the parties.

-2-

(4)

The Decree of Divorce shall also be modified to

include the following:
During any given period in which the defendant shall
have extended visitation with the minor child(ren) of 25
consecutive days or more, the amount of child support the
defendant is required to pay to the plaintiff shall decrease by
25% during the period of extended visitation.
(5)

The plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of

$4,394.00 against the defendant as and for attorneys1 fees and
costs which the plaintiff has incurred in^fchis matter.
Dated this / / d a y ot ^ffypyjc^
B^JME

-31-FOX-J1

, 1989.
COW^T:

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this

/

day of April,

1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE AND
JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to Greg S. Ericksen, 1065 South 500
West, Bountiful, Utah 84010.

Robert W. Hughes
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1 IN THU DISTRICT COURT OF _HZ THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT III AND
2

FOR SALT LAK2 COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

* * *

4 DiiAHN** FOXLLY,
5
6

Plaintiff,

Case No. D 82 1591

vs.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

7 WILLIAIi FOXLi-Y,
8

Defendant.

9

* * *

10
11

This cause came on to be heard before the

12 HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, one of the Judges of the said
13 Court, on the 7th day of March, 1989, when and where the
14 following proceedings were had.
15

* * *

16

APPLARAliCES

17 For the Plaintiff;
18
19
20
21

For the Defendant;

MR. ROBERT W. HUGHES
Attorney at Law
50 West Third South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah
I-3R. GRLG S. ERICKSaM
Attorney at Law
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Utah
34010

22
23
24
25
HAL H. WALTON
Registered Professional Reporter

ill",. LIiICl^-I-1: Your case is closed.
IIP*. HUGHES:

YOu and I agreed v;e would put on my

attorney's f^cs, in charters this morning.
the last thing we did.

That would be

I said I would do it by proffer.

hR. ^RIC::£~1I: I said I have no objections if you
did it during your case,
:u\. IIUGIIL-G. Move to proffer my attorney's fees,
your Honor.
TH~ COURT;

You raay .go ahead.

•IK. IIUGIUG: Your Honor, let ne have these marked,
if I could, please.
Court.

Two documents I would submit to the

Exhibits Ko. 16 and 17. Exhibit Ko. 16 v/ould be

the monthly statements that I sent to the plaintiff for
services rendered and would show an amount due presently,
including payments which she has made, of $3,180.

exhibit

No. 17 was an affidavit that I prepared and filed with the
Court for our first hearing, one of cur first hearings on
this matter, indicating my attorney's fees for $1,S65 up
until February.

The Court, if it reviews this, will notice

that from about 1937 up until February, it showed that
Deanna Foxley had a credit and that there were no services
provided during that time.

The problem was that we had

changed billings at that time and those were not represented on the new computer bills that we entered into. For
ease of the Court, I v/ould waive my initial attorney's fees

114

1

in this natter, the $1,900, and sub:lit .My attorney's fee

2 I would be as indicated in Plaintiff's Lxhibit Ho. 16 and total
3

$3,000.

I would have to include the payments as indicated

4 made to me by the plaintiff.
*

I would move for the adialssion of Plaintiff's

6

exhibit 2-k>s. 16 and 17.

7

VIIL COUKT:

*

1!?.. jJ]<ICKL>bM: Over objection.

*

THL COURT: Will be received.

Over objection?

10

You gentlemen want summary?

11

Ilcl. H-'.IC\JUN:

12

TII^ COURT: We'll take a ten-minute break so Hal

Likt* a closing, yes.

13 can rest his fingers. We'll come back and listen to
14 closing.
15 I

(Whereupon, the recess was taken.)

16

THL C0US2:

17

I-iI\. UP.ICKoi;IT; First address child supportf your

** I Honor.

You nay proceed.

The Uniform Child Support guidelines overview

1' I requires that worksheets must be completed in accordance
*0 ' with instructions contained therein and submitted to the
21 I Court with supporting financial certification.

The problem

that I have got with Ilr. Hughes1 offer of his schedule is
*' number one, tht.it* was no foundation for it, and number two,
** no ability to cross-examine by the defendant, number three,
** it was submitted after he closed his case, and number four,
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GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002
Attorney for Defendant
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Ut 84010
Telephone:(801)295-6841
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY,

)
Plaintiff,

)

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S PEES
OF ROBERT W. HUGHES
CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

VS.

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,

)

Defendant.

)

COMES NOW Greg S. Ericksen, counsel for Defendant who
objects to Supplement to Attorney's fees of Robert W. Hughes
based on the following:
Counsel for Plaintiff Robert W. Hughes did not submit his
attorney's fees during trial of this matter, and submits evidence
of attorney's fees after the case has been^Kejard and/a^j^ed^
DATED this A\

day of March, 1989,
/GRHt3 S. ERICAS
^Counsel for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of March, 1989, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection was mailed via
first class mail, postage pre-paid thereon to Robert W. Hughes at
the following address: 1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101.
4ARY HAlLMAN
MISCrFoxley

TabF

Robert W. Hughes (1573)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1074
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff,

;
i:

SUPPLEMENT TO ATTORNEYS
FEES OF ROBERT W. HUGHES

VS.

!

WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,

!:

Civil No: D82-1591

::

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendant.

Attached hereto is a copy of the attorneys' fees
incurred by Robert W. Hughes through the date of trial*

This

submission is to supplement the exhibit of attorneys' fees
submitted at trial.
DATED this | (p day of March, 1989.

W1-FOX-SA1

Robert W. Hughes
Attorney at Law
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
(801) 534-1074

DeAnna Foxley
735 Wall Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

BILLING DATE
ACC'T NO.

84102

03-13-89
HD-RWH-32
RWH87DM-816-1

$3,180.00

DEVIOUS BALANCE
iTE

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED

INDIV

TIME

-28-89
-02-89
-02-89
-05-89
-05-89
-06-89
-06-89
-06-89
-07-89
-07-89
-07-89

Conference with client(s).
Preparation for hearing,
Preparation of Response to Motion.
Preparation of Response to Motion.
Preparation for hearing.
Conference with client(s).
Preparation for hearing.
Telephone conf. with opposing attorney,
Preparation for hearing.
Court appearance for hearing.
Conference with client(s).

RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH
RWH

1.10
1.00
0.60
2.60
2.80
1.20
4.80
0.20
1.20
5.40
0.80

$66.00
$60.00
$36.00
$156.00
$168.00
$72.00
$288.00
$12.00
$72.00
$324.00
$48.00

21.70

$1,302.00

>TAL FOR THE ABOVE SERVICES
kTE

-07-89

EXPENSES
$62.25

Transcript Cost.

$62.25

'TAL FOR THE ABOVE EXPENSES
TOTAL
PAYMENT RECEIVED
Q2—27—89
TOTAL PAYMENTS

$4,544.25

$150.00
$150.00
AMOUNT DUE

Prompt payment is appreciated.
Make check payable to Robert W. Hughes.
*** THANK YOU ***

$4,394.25

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

\(f7

day of March,

1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENT TO
ATTORNEYS FEES OF ROBERT W. HUGHES was mailed, first-class
postage thereon prepaid, to Greg S. Ericksen, 1065 South 300
East, Bountiful, Utah 84010.

Roft^rt MJ fttltjhes

TabG

GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002
Attorney for Defendant
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Ut 84010
Telephone:(801)295-6841
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY,

)
Plaintiff,

vs.
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
:
)

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT FARE

)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

)

ss .

COMES NOW Robert Farr, who being duly placed under oat1
deposes and says as follows:
1.

That on about March, 1985, I became acquainted with one

Deanna Foxley.
2.

During the course of 3 years from March, 1985 to about

July, 1988, I saw her socially.
3.

That during the period that I knew her, she informed me

that she was involved in a court action with her ex-husband, Bill
Foxley.
4

That during the co\irse of our involvement she confided

the following information to me.
A.

That she had to appear as if she was destitute in

order to get a big settlement from her ex-husband.
1

B.
that would

She to]d me that she had turned down job offers
have paid her

$40,000.00 per year until after the

court case with Bill Foxley was completed.
C.

She

told

me

that

she borrowed

money

for

her

education to make it appear that she was rehabilitating herself.
D.

She told me that she kept her work hours to a

minimum so it would appear that she earned very little.
E.

She told me that she would not disclose the fact

that she had other income from other jobs to Bill's attorney.
F.

She told me that her attorney advised her to open

a secret bank account that would not disclose all of her money
that she had or earned.
She

told

me

that

she

would

not

tell

Bill's

attorney about the bank account but that it would be kept secret.
The bank account was kept at Utah Bank & Trust
und^r the name of Deanna Foxley and her daughter Kristine Foxley.
G.

That

she

obtained

copies

of

cases

from

her

attorney so she could read them.
5.

That in April, 1989 T contacted Greg S. Ericksen with

this information.
DATED this

day of May, 1989.
\

2

k
OBERT S. FARR

STATE OF UTAH
SS
COUNTY OF DAVIS )
The undersigned being a Notary Public does hereby certify
that on this
day of May, 1989, personally appeared before
me, Robert Farr, who executed the forerjoing Affidavit.

K.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My commission expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
day of May, 1989 a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit was mailed via firstclass roai.1. postage pre-paid thereon to Robert W. Hughes at
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101,
MARY PETERSEN

MISC:Foxley-F.aff

3
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GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002
Attorney for Defendant
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, Ut 84010
Telephone:(801)295-6841
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
MAUREEN HEGSTED

)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

)

)
:

SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
COMES NOW, Maureen Hegsted, who states that on or about
March 20, 1989, Deanna Foxley did give me the attached letter and
statement that she did represent to be the cash expenditures that
she has made on the home located at 735 Wall Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
DATED this

1st

day of June, 1989.
\ ^

MAUREEN HEGSTED

1

The undersigned being a Notary Public does hereby certify
that on this 1st day of June, 1989, personally appeared before
me, Maureen Hegsted, who executed the foregoing Affidavit.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:_
My commission expires:

2

"MAJOR" IMPROVEMENTS MADE ON PROPERTY AT 735 WALL STREET, SALT IAKE
CITY, UTAH BY DEANNA 0. POXLEY:

ITEM

APPRQX. POST

1. Insulation:
a. Ceiling
b. basement
c. breakfast rocm

$ 1,500.00

2. Remodeling:
a. Kitchen (cabinets, sink)
b. Flooring (kitchen, breakfast rocm, bath,
wash rocm)
c. Carpeting (7 rocms)
d. Upstairs bath (cabinets, toilet, shcwer)
e. Interior spiral stairway
f. Added new small rocm dcwnstairs
g. Remodeled upper floor plan
h. Complete new front porch flooring and railing
3. Permanent fixtures:
a. Levelor blinds
b. Ceiling fan/light fixture
c. Dishwasher
d. Hot water heater

11,500.00

1,250.00

4. Energy-efficient heating unit

850.00

5. Storm Doors & Windows

550.00

6. Miscellaneous:
a. Rain gutters
b. Exterior paint (1988)
c. Subbed in wash rocm
d. Yard trees, shrubs, flcwers, sod
e. Yard-fill to improve front yard

1,750.00

7. General electrical and plumbing work:

1,500.00

8. Fencing:

700.00

TOTAL

$19,600.00

March 20, 1989

Maurine:
Please find enclosed the tax statement that you requested along vdth
a Quit-Claim Deed from Bill and a Quit-Claim Deed fran myself. I
have also included the list of "major" inprovonents viiich you asked
for. I hope these will be helpful.
I will wait to hear from you after your return from Louisiana.
Sincerely yours,

UPAs

Tab I

GREG S. EPICKSEN - 1002
Attorney for Defendant
1065 South 500 West
Bountiful, 171 84010
Telephone: {80!}295-6a«i7
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,
Defendant.

)
)
)

MOTION TO FIND PLAINTIFF IN
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR PERJURY

)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO.

D82-1591

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

)

COMES NOW, Defendant above-named through counsel,, who moves
the Court to find Plaintiff, Peanna Foxley. in contempt of court
for perjury in sworn statements and testimony giT-'en before this
court.
Said motion is based on the pleadings submitted in this

case

which show on their face that Plaintiff has lied to the court and
committed perjury.
1.

Plaintiff, in an affidavit dated May 16, 1989, made the

following sworn statements that are in direct contradiction to
her previous sworn statements and testimony at trial.
A.

Mrs. Foxley states on May 16, 1989, that she gave one

Robert Farr money during

1986 and 1987 for a one-half

interest in an airplane and that Mr. Farr owed her money.

(1/2)
She

indicates that she was to receive money for rental of an airplane
and that she considered the money a loan.
1

On January 21, 1987, Plaintiff was asked to list all persons
who owed her money.

She deliberately ommitted Robert Farr (see

Exhibit A attached).
On January

21, 1987, Plaintiff was asked if she had any

business enterprises.

She answered no despite the fact that she

now states she bought a plane to lease for business purposes.
The

thrust

of Plaintiff, Deanna

Foxiey's

testimony

in

pleadings and at trial was that she was so destitute that she
could not pay property taxes for 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
and 1988.
Yet through an undisclosed checking acount, she was spending
what she alleges is close to $4,500.00 to purchase an airplane.
Defendants investigation into other allegations of perjury
is continuing.
B.

Mrs. Foxley states on May 16, 1989, that she had two

checking accounts.
opened in 1985.

One account,was opened in 1983, the other was

She states in her affidavit that both accounts

were used for the same purpose, "during the time both accounts
were open, I used them for the same purposes, i.e. payment of my
monthly expenses."

She testifies that she had both checking

accounts until March 1988.
On January 21, 1987, Plaintiff stated under oath that she
had one checking account and one savings account when, in fact,
she had two checking accounts (see Exhibit B attached).
On March 24, 1988, Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, appeared at a
deposition

and

there pursuant
2

to a Request

for Production,

produced
period

all

checks that she had written for a six (6) month

(July 1987 through February 1988).

frcm what

she represented

The deposition

and

representations

She produced checks

as her only account

pre-trial

that- she

discovery

only

had

(0577 account).

is replete with her

one

bank

account

(0577

account).
At trial when Defendant through counsel put in an exhibit of
her checks covering a period of P £ Y (6) months, from July 1987
through

January

1988

(0577 account)., produced at deposition,

Plaintiff Deanra Foxley was asked and answered as follows:
MR. ERICKSEN-

Do yon have any othe^ checking accounts the4

you would have run money through9
A.
The

No , J do not.
trial

transcript

is al^o r^ni^t-R with references that

she only had one checking account
After

trial Robert Farr disclosed

Foxley, had another checking account.

that Plaintiff; Deanna
He states she kept this

account secret

from Defendant, Bill Foxley.

Attached

is check

1414 attached

to her most recent affidavit of a check written

during the discovery period but not disclosed.
In 20(h) of her recent affidavit, Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley
makes

the assertion that she has attached statements from the

initial

account

(the 3998 account) as proof that she had no

secret assets.
The fact is that the (3998) was never disclosed.
the request

Further,

for production was for July 1987 through February
3

1988 not

for

the year

1986 as Plaintiff

has attached.

In

response to the request for production, Plaintiff produced copies
of checks and statements from July 1987 through February 1988
from the (0577 account) see example attached.
There

is absolutely

no question

tha^ Plaintiff ;

Foxley, lied both in pre-trial discovery and at trial.

Deanna
Her May

16, 1989 affidavit confirms that.
The information and verification of how much income she had
and her expenses as contained

in her

absolutely essential to Defendant's oas^

financial

records was

Had Defendant known of

the other account, it would have been subpoened.
It is clear on its face that Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley lied
and should be held in contempt of court for perjury.
DATED this

Jw

day of May, 1989.

!SEN
/Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of May, 1989 a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion To Find Plaintiff In
Contempt of Court was hand delivered to Robert W. Hughes at:
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

MARY PETERSEN

MISC:Foxley

4

^

therein you may have held by any person/ firm or business
entity in your behalf.
ANSWER:
50.

None.

Please list the names and addresses of each person

or business entity that owes you money.
ANSWER:

William N. Foxley, 9448 Parkwood Avenue,

Davison, Michigan
51.

48423.

Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, have you

engaged in any business enterprise, either solely or jointly
with other individuals or businesses?

If so, please state

the names and addresses of each person or business entity and
the beginning date and ending date of any business
enterprise.
ANSWER:
52.

No.

Please state any and all funds which you received

from any other source, personf entity, gift or donation which
are used for the payment of your monthly expenses by listing
for each said fund the name and address of the person making
said contribution, the gross and net amount of each
contribution per month, the total amount of contributions
paid during the years of 1984 and 1985 and the basis and
purpose for each said contribution.
ANSWER:

Child support from William N. Foxley, $600.00

per month, Court ordered; alimony from William N. Foxley,

the Defendant has sold any of the securities so listed,
please describe the type and number of securities sold, the
name of the issuing entity, the date of sale, the sale price
and the net gain or loss which resulted from the sale.
ANSWER:
45.

Not applicable.

Subsequent to the entry of the prior Order of the

Court herein, have you obtained any savings or commercial
accounts in your name solely or jointly with others in any
bank or financial institution?

If so, for each and every

account, please state the name and address of the bank or
financial institution, the type of the account, the names on
the account, the names on the persons authorized to draw on
the account, the account number, and the present balance, if
any, or the amount of the last before the account was closed.
ANSWER:

Yes.

Bank of Utah, 175 South West Temple,

Salt Lake City, Utah, checking account #0359, in Deanna and
Kristine Foxley's name, $200.00; and Bank of Utah, savings
account #7048, in Deanna Foxley's name, $1,100.00.
46.

Subsequent to the date of the entry of the Decree

of Divorce herein, have there been any bank accounts in which
your name did not appear but to which you deposited money or
withdrew money by check or other method?

If so, for each

account please state the name and address of the bank or
financial institution, the name under which the account
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Robert W. Hughes (1573)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1074
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEANNA FOXLEY,
Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

vs.
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY,
Defendant.

Civil No: D82-1591
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Robert W. Hughes, attorney for Plaintiff, certify the
following documents:
Motion to Disqualify attorney;
Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Post Trial
Motions and Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions;
And, Plaintiff's Affidavit*
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Greg S. Erickson, Esquire, 1065
South 500 West, Bountiful, Utah, 84010.
DATED this Ufl^day of May, 1989,

lughes

Tab J

THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. (0128)
Attorney for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1309
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-4600
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
OOoOooo
DEANNA S. FOXLEY,

SUMMONS
Plaintiff,
vs,

Civil No-

ROBERT S. FARR,
Judge
Defendant.
-oooOoooTHE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in
writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the aboveentitled Courtf and to serve upon or mail to Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.,
attorney for plaintiff, at 310 South Main Street, Suite 1309, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101, a copy of said answer, within twenty (20) days
after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has been
filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is hereby
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this

ZS

day of

\c^~i

, 1989,

THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR.

Defendant's address:
1885 East 7700 S.
South Weber City, UT 84405
KW139.22

Attorney for Plaint
310 South Main Stre
Salt Lake City, Uta

THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. (0128)
Attorney for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1309
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-4600
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
oooOooo
DEANNA S. FOXLEY,

:
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:
Civil No.

ROBERT S. FARR,

:
Judge

Defendant.

:
oooOooo

COMES NOW the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, by and
through her attorney Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and for cause of action
against the defendant, alleges as follows:
1.

That plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State

of Utah, and, at the time of the transactions hereinafter referred
to, defendant was a resident of Salt Lake County, in the State of
Utah.
2.

That defendant is the registered owner of a Piper

aircraft, model PA 28 151 Warrior, FAA Registration No. N40953,
including a King 4096 Transponder and King two-way radio.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
3.

That the parties entered into an agreement whereby the

plaintiff purchased a one-half interest in said Piper aircraft for
the sum of $4,572.55.
4.

That the parties cannot now agree on the use or

disposition of the Piper aircraft, but the defendant refuses to sell
the same or to reimburse the plaintiff for her interest therein.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
5.

That, in the alternative, the plaintiff loaned to

defendant the sum of $4,572*55 to be utilized in purchasing and
maintaining the Piper aircraft.
6.

That the defendant has failed and refused to reimburse

the plaintiff for the loan proceeds.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against defendant as
follows:
1.

On her first cause of action, for judgment against the

defendant in the sum of $4,572.55.
2.

On her first cause of action, for interest on said sum

from the time paid to defendant until the time of judgment.
3.

For costs of this action.

4.

On her second cause of action, for judgment against the

defendant in the sum of $4,572.55.
5.

For interest on said sum from the time received by

defendant until the date of judgment.
6.

For the costs of this action.

DATED this

2S

day of

-3IA^U<I^

, 1989.

THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR.

IkoWcS 1 -l,^,^
Plaintiff's address:
735 Wall Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

Thomas N. Arnett,
Attorney for Plairft
KW139.19

-2-

